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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review orders of
the Industrial Commission pursuant to former Utah Code Ann.
§ 35-1-86 (1994) (repealed effective July 1, 1997); Utah Code
Ann. § 34A-l-303(6) (1997)).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the Industrial Commission properly found that

Petitioner George Farnworth (the "applicant") had failed to
establish that he was unable to work as a result of his claimed
industrial injuries.
This issue requires review of the Industrial Commission's
factual findings.

These findings are entitled to deference,

and the Court of Appeals will reverse such findings only if the
petitioner

establishes

that

they

are

not

"supported

by

substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record
before the court."

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(g) (1997).

A

person challenging such findings must marshal all the evidence
supporting the findings, and then demonstrate that the findings
are not supported by the evidence.

VanLeeuwen v. Indus.

Comm'n, 901 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
2.

Whether the Industrial Commission applied an incor-

rect standard in determining that the applicant failed to
establish that his claimed permanent total disability was
medically caused by his industrial injuries*

1

This is a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(d) (1994).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (198811
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is
injured and the dependents of each such employee who
is killed, by accident arising out of and in the
course of his employment, wherever such injury
occurred, if the accident was not purposely selfinflicted, shall be paid compensation for loss
sustained on account of the injury or death, and
such amount for medical, nurse, and hospital
services and medicines, and, in case of death, such
amount of funeral expenses, as provided in this
chapter.
The responsibility for compensation and
payment of medical, nursing, and hospital services
and medicines, and funeral expenses provided under
this chapter shall be on the employer and its
insurance carrier and not on the employee.
Utah Code Ann. S 35-1-67 (1988)
(1)
In cases of permanent total disability
caused by an industrial accident, the employee shall
receive compensation as outlined in this section. .

2

These statutes are presented as in effect on May 2, 1989,
the date of the injury which is the subject of this appeal.
See, e.g. , Brown & Root Indus. Serv. v. Indus. Comm'n, 328 Utah
Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (October 14, 1997) ("the law existing at the
time of the injury applies in relation to that injury"). This
statute has been amended and recodified at Utah Code Ann.
§ 34A-2-413 (1997) .

2
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1).

The applicant filed a timely Motion for Review.

58.

The

Commission

denied

the

motion,

R. 155-

adopting

Judge

Elicerio's analysis and her conclusion that the applicant's
work injuries did not cause his claimed disability.

R. 183-85

(Addendum Exhibit 2 ) . This appeal followed.

Statement of Facts
Petitioner George Farnworth (the "applicant") is seeking
to have the Utah Transit Authority pay him permanent total
disability compensation for elbow pain that came on while he
was working for UTA in 1989 and subsided by 1993.

On May 2,

1989, he sustained an injury to his right elbow in the course
of his employment as a bus driver.

He was diagnosed as having

lateral epicondylitis, and he underwent surgery in July 1989
and January 1991. R. 146-47. He also underwent surgery on his
left elbow in November 1992, after it developed epicondylitis
as well.2 By April 1993, his right arm problems had "completely resolved," and he had only an "occasional bit of discomfort"
in his left arm.

R. 342/313.3

He was released to work around

that time, and he has not sought any treatment or reported any
arm pain to medical professionals since April 1993.

2

The left arm problem was found to be work-related by the
Industrial Commission in 1992. R. 74-84.
3

In paginating the record for appeal, the Industrial
Commission did not number each of the pages in the medical
records exhibit or the Social Security records exhibit. The
citation "R. 342/313" means page 313 of the medical records
exhibit, which begins at page 342 of the Record on Appeal.
4
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343/14.

He was first treated in approximately 1973 or 1974,

and he has attempted suicide at least five or six times.

Id.

His emotional and behavioral problems were attributed to his
extremely tragic and violent family-of-origin problems.

His

father was abusive and violent and even went to prison for
murdering

the applicant's brother.

R.

145, 343/015.

In

December 1990, he began to see a counselor, Katrina H. Miller,
L.M.F.T.

R. 224-228. The applicant spent the majority of his

sessions discussing problems he was having with his wife,
including difficulties in communication, problems with marital
relations, problems with his stepdaughter, control of finances,
etc.

Id.

He also indicated distress over the fact that both

of his parents had died. R. 224. He further reported feelings
of guilt for becoming annoyed with his stepfather, who was
calling him three or four times per day.

Id.

also

angry

noted

in one

session

that

he was

The applicant
at UTA

"fighting" with them over a treatment for his elbows.

Id.

and
He

saw Ms. Miller only four times, however, with the last visit on
February 12, 1991.

R. 159.

In August 1992, the applicant applied for Social Security
disability benefits. R. 343/001. In October of that year, his
claim was denied, because his condition did not prevent him
from working.

R. 343/004-006.

The hearing officer dismissed

claims of both arm pain and depression. The officer noted that
he had recovered from surgery and had full range of motion in

6
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J n en i

his
chronic pain
'"Il'llii

Il

I

r

asked him to explain why he was unable to work, and the
applicant stated that it was because of "chronic pain."

Id.

Dr. Heinbecker concluded that the applicant's depression
was in partial remission, but that he did have a personality
disorder with
features."

"passive-aggressive

R. 343/017.

borderline

and

dependent

Dr. Heinbecker reported that the

applicant was capable of handling his own funds and was able to
understand and remember.
ability

to

sustain

Id.

He noted that the applicant's

concentration

was

impaired,

depression, but by his claimed chronic pain.

not

by

Id.

The applicant presented numerous complaints to Dr. McFadden, including asthma, depression, severe migraine headaches
(lasting up to two days and often accompanied by nausea),
recurrent esophagitis, epicondylitis, back pain, sleep apnea,
and hand tremors.

R. 343/021-22.

Dr. McFadden examined the

applicant and reported that his elbows were nontender, that
wrist extension and supination against resistance were not
painful, and that the applicant had equal grip strength and was
able to open a childproof container with one hand. R. 343/023.
He

noted

that

the

epicondylitis
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restrictions with mild exertion today."
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"minimal

R. 343/024.

The applicant's request for reconsideration was denied by
the Social Security Administration.
letter

indicated
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R. 343/026.
the
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been

diagnosed with depression, he was able to work.
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letter also pointed out that the applicant's motor and sensory
8
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history

R. 150-52.
of

giving

She found that the applicant had a

unreliable

information

to

the

doctors

evaluating him for the Social Security Administration.

R. 151.

For example, she noted that the applicant's right arm had been
assessed to be normal and pain-free by mid-1991, and that in
the spring of 1993 Dr. Sellers, his treating physician, consistently

found

resolved.

that

Id.

his

right

arm

problems

had

completely

However, at the very same time, the applicant

was telling Dr. Heinbecker that the right arm surgery was not
successful.

Id.

Judge Elicerio also found that the applicant was presently
exaggerating the significance of the 1989 industrial accident
and downplaying his nonindustrial problems, while he did the
opposite when he was seeking Social Security benefits.

Id.

She noted that, at the time of the Social Security proceedings,
the applicant reported that his left arm surgery was successful, that he did not relate his arm pain as his most bothersome
problem, and that his arm problems were found to cause only
minimal restrictions.

Now, however, he was claiming that his

arm pain was his most serious problem.

Id.

She also noted

that the applicant presented multiple nonindustrial sources of
depression in 1993, but now he was claiming that the depression
was related primarily to the arm pain.

Id.

And she pointed

out that the applicant previously had claimed gastrointestinal
problems and had said that his surgery was unsuccessful, but
now he was saying that he had not had any gastrointestinal
10

problems since 1990. Id,

She further noted that the applicant

was now attempting to attribute his hand tremor and sleep apnea
to the industrial accident, when there was no evidence to
support such a contention.
In addition

Id.

to finding the applicant's

testimony

not

credible, Judge Elicerio found that the applicant had failed to
prove that he was suffering from any limitations resulting from
his 1989 industrial accident.

Regarding his arm pain, she

noted that the preponderance of the evidence showed that the
applicant had a good recovery from his arm surgeries, with only
minimal restrictions.

R. 152.

Regarding the depression, she

found that the applicant failed to prove that he had permanent
depression, that there was any residual pain to act as a source
for his depression, or that any depression he had was related
to his arm injury.

R. 150, 152. She noted that the applicant

had not received treatment for his depression since 1991, while
he had sought treatment for a number of other problems (supposedly of lesser significance), and that the most logical
explanation
significantly

was

that

affecting

the

applicant's

him.

R.

depression

150-51.

Judge

was

not

Elicerio

acknowledged that the applicant had received a six percent
permanent impairment for his arm injury, but she declined to
find the applicant

entitled

to permanent

benefits solely on this basis.

total

disability

R. 152.

On review, the Industrial Commission confirmed Judge Elicerio' s ruling.

The Commission adopted her findings of fact
11

and analysis and concluded that the applicant's work injuries
did not medically cause his alleged permanent total disability.
R. 184.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Applicant George Farnworth seeks to have the Utah Transit
Authority pay him permanent total disability compensation for
arm injuries and depression allegedly related to an arm injury
he suffered in 1989, which cleared up years ago.
his claim before the Industrial Commission.

He brought

The Commission's

administrative law judge carefully weighed the medical evidence, considered his testimony, and found that he had no case,
because he was not a credible witness, and because he failed to
prove that he was suffering

from any disabling

attributable to the 1989 industrial injury.
appeals, but

conditions

The applicant now

he has failed to demonstrate

anything wrong with the Commission's findings.

that

there was

Therefore, the

Commission's order should be affirmed.
First,

substantial

evidence

supports

the

Industrial

Commission's finding that the applicant was not disabled due to
his industrial accident.

To be entitled to permanent total

disability

an

compensation,

employee

must

prove

disability is "caused by" an industrial accident.

that

his

If he fails

to establish the necessary causal connection, compensation must
be denied.

This is a question of fact, and the Commission's
12

finding will be upheld on appeal unless the petitioner marshals
all of the evidence supporting the finding and demonstrates
that the finding is not supported by substantial evidence. J
The Commission

found, as a factual matter, that

the

applicant was not suffering any disability attributable to his
1989 injuries.

The Commission, by adopting the findings and

conclusions of the administrative law judge, found that the
applicant's arm pain had resolved years ago, and that the
applicant failed to prove that any depression he was suffering
was related to the arm injury.
the applicant

The Commission also found that

failed to establish that his depression was

causing any disability.
These

findings must

be affirmed.

The applicant

has

completely neglected to marshal the evidence supporting the
findings,

and

the

findings

are

supported

by

substantial

evidence.

The medical evidence shows that the applicant's arm

pain had cleared up years ago and that the applicant had
longstanding preexisting depression, and the evidence does not
prove that the applicant's depression is linked to his arm
injuries, or that the depression is disabling.

In addition,

the medical evidence also reveals numerous other physical and
emotional problems, completely
accident.

unrelated to any industrial

The applicant testified that he had severe arm pain

and depression, and that they were brought on by the 1989
injuries, but the administrative law judge specifically found

13

that his testimony was not credible, and that he had a history
of saying whatever he felt necessary to obtain compensation.
Instead of marshaling the evidence supporting the findings, the applicant relies on two pieces of evidence
dicting

contra-

the findings. But this evidence is not persuasive, and

it certainly does not require reversal of the Commission's
findings. The applicant relies on a Social Security award, but
that award is not very probative.

And the applicant also

relies on a letter written by a mental health therapist, but
that therapist has no basis for making an assessment as to the
applicant's present condition or its causes, as she has not
seen him since 1991. The Commission's findings are entitled to
deference, and as such they must be affirmed.
In addition, the Commission did not apply an improper
standard

in determining

that the applicant

had

failed

establish that his disability was caused by his injuries.

to
The

Commission's findings establish that the applicant failed to
prove that he was suffering from any

disabling conditions

related to his arm injuries. The administrative law judge did
express

uncertainty

causation

standard,

as

to

but

the
her

precise

boundaries

thorough

analysis

of

the

clearly

demonstrates that the test she actually applied is correct.

14

ARGUMENT
I.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S FINDING OF LACK OF MEDICAL
CAUSATION IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
The Commission's order should be affirmed.

An employee

seeking permanent total disability benefits must prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that his disability was "caused
by" an industrial accident.
meet this burden.

The applicant simply failed to

The Commission found that the applicant

failed to establish that he was presently suffering from any
problems related to the industrial accident. The applicant has
not

marshalled

the

evidence

supporting

the

Commission's

findings, so they must be taken as conclusive, and these
findings are supported by substantial evidence regardless.
A.

The applicant failed to prove that he is suffering
from any disability related to his 1989 industrial
accident.

To be entitled to permanent total disability compensation,
an employee must establish that his permanent total disability
is "caused by an industrial accident."

Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-

67(1) (1988) (amended and recodified at Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2413 (1997)).
contributing

Where an employee has a number of conditions
to

permanent

total

disability,4

his

or

her

4

As did Judge Elicerio in her October 15, 1996, order,

defendants assume, for purposes

of this

appeal

only,

that the

applicant is permanently and totally disabled.
Defendants
emphatically do not concede that the applicant is
actually
permanently and totally disabled, and we point out that no such
finding has been made.
In fact, in its order denying the
motion for review, the Industrial Commission took pains to
15

employer

is liable to pay compensation

only if the health

problems giving rise to the alleged disability are "causally
connected to the claimant's employment."

Ortiz v. Indus.

Commln, 766 P.2d 1092, 1094-95 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); see also
Large v. Indus. Comm'n, 758 P.2d 954, 956 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
The burden of proof is on the applicant, and he or she must
prove medical causation by a preponderance of the evidence.
Ortiz, 766 P.2d at 1095 (citing Large, 758 P.2d at 956).

If

the applicant fails to demonstrate a medical causal connection,
compensation must be denied.

Id. at 1094-95.

Medical causation is a question of fact to be determined
by the Industrial Commission.

Zupon v. Indus. Comm'n, 860 P.2d

960, 963 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). When a petitioner challenges an
agency's findings of fact, the appellate court must uphold the
findings unless the petitioner establishes that they are not
supported by "substantial evidence when viewed in light of the
whole record before the court."

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-

16(4)(g) (1997); VanLeeuwen v. Indus. Comm'n. 901 P.2d 281, 284
(Utah Ct. App. 1995).

The party challenging findings of fact

must "'marshal all of the evidence supporting the findings and
show that despite the supporting facts, the [agency's] findings
are not supported by substantial evidence.'"

VanLeeuwen, 901

point out that it was referring to the applicant's "nowclaimed" and "alleged" permanent total disability. R. at 184.
Therefore, in the unlikely event that this court were to
reverse the Industrial Commission's order, the matter would
have to be remanded to the Industrial Commission for a
determination of all issues, including whether the applicant
does in fact qualify as permanently and totally disabled.
16

P.2d at 284 (brackets in original).

If the applicant fails to

marshal the evidence supporting factual findings, the findings
will accepted as conclusive. E.g., Merriam v. Board of Review,
812 P.2d 447, 450 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
In our case, the administrative law judge found that the
applicant had failed to prove that any disability he had was
medically caused by his 1989 industrial accident.

The appli-

cant claims that he is unable to work because of arm pain and
depression caused by the 1989 injuries, but the judge found
that the applicant was not suffering any disability under
either theory.

First, the applicant failed to prove that he

was

any

suffering

administrative

problems

because

law judge found,

of

arm

pain.

"The preponderance

The
of the

reliable evidence shows that the applicant had a good recovery
from his industrial arm surgeries, with only minimal residual
activity restriction and possibly discomfort."

R. 152.

The

applicant also failed to prove his second theory, that he is
disabled by depression brought on by the industrial accident.
The

administrative

law

judge

found

that

"the

applicant's

inability to work at this time is not caused by any permanent
aggravation to his preexisting depression resulting from arm
pain associated with the industrial accident."

17

R. 152.

!

B.

The Commission's
appeal.
1.

findings

must

be

affirmed

on

The applicant failed to marshal the evidence
behind the findings, and as such the findings
must be taken as conclusive.

If a party challenging factual findings fails to marshal
the evidence supporting those findings, then the findings will
be taken as conclusive.

Merriam v. Board of Review, 812 P.2d

447, 450 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

In our case, the applicant has

not marshaled any of the evidence supporting the Commission's
critical findings.

Instead, the only evidence he presents is

evidence contradicting

those findings. This does not meet the

marshaling requirement, and as such the Commission's findings
must be affirmed.

Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v. Board of

Review, 839 P.2d 841, 844 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
2.

The Commission's findings
substantial evidence.
a.

are

supported

by

Substantial
evidence
supports
the
Commission's finding that the applicant is
not suffering any disability caused by arm
pain.

In addition, even if this court were to review these
findings on the merits, it would easily conclude

that the

findings are based on substantial evidence. First, substantial
evidence supports the judge's finding that the applicant is no
longer suffering from any arm pain.
records

show

only

a

good

As the judge noted, "the

surgical

result

from

the

arm

surgeries, with little or no pain or restriction in the arms by
April 1993." R. 150. The applicant underwent his last surgery
on his right elbow in January 1991.
18

R. 342/036.

By June of

that year, that elbow was "doing quite well," R. 342/299, and
by that

September,

it was

"great":

he reported

no pain

whatsoever in his arm, wrist, hand, or fingers, and no numbness
or tingling.

R. 342/464.

From September 1991 through April 1993, the applicant saw
Dr. Daniel Sellers at least six times for treatment on his
other elbow, and he never raised a single complaint about any
right arm pain. R. 342/302 - 342/313. Finally, in April 1993,
Dr. Sellers reported that the applicant's right arm problems
had "completely resolved."

R. 342/313.

It is an interesting

coincidence that the only times the applicant ever

complained

of right arm pain after June 1991 were (1) when he was seeking
Social

Security

disability,

and

workers' compensation benefits.

(2) when

he was

seeking

R. 343/015, R. 149.

There is also evidence to support the judge's finding that
the applicant was not suffering any residual problems from his
left

arm. By April 1993, the applicant had "just an occasional

bit of discomfort," and that was only after using his arm
extensively."

R.

342/313.

Further,

the

consultation

examination performed by Dr. McFadden on behalf of the Social
Security Administration revealed only "minimal restrictions."
R.

343/024.

And

again,

the

applicant

did

not

seek any

treatment for his left arm after April 1993, while he did seek
treatment for a number of other medical problems.
The only evidence the applicant presents to challenge the
Commission's finding regarding arm pain is the claim that the
19

Social

Security

ALJ,

Judge

Robin

Henrie,

applicant had "severe" epicondylitis.

found

R. 343/034.

that

the

However,

this is not compelling evidence.
First, Judge Henrie's ruling does not necessarily indicate
that he found that the applicant's epicondylitis was severe.
Judge Henrie stated the following:
The claimant's impairments which are considered to
be "severe" under the Social Security Act are back
problems, upper lateral epicondylitis in both arms,
migraine headaches, asthma, depression, and radial
tunnel syndrome.
R. 343/034.

But while this means that the ALJ found that the

"impairments" were severe, it does not indicate that the ALJ
found that the epicondylitis
Security

Administration

was severe.
regulations,

For under the Social

if

a

claimant

disability for more than one impairment, the combined

effect

seeks
of

those impairments is considered in a disability claim, without
regard to whether any single impairment is "severe." 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1523 (1997).
But even if Judge Henrie did find that the applicant had
severe epicondylitis, that would not justify reversing the
Commission.

Judge Henrie's ruling is not "evidence"; there is

nothing to show that he is a qualified medical expert on
epicondylitis. In addition, a ruling in an informal, nonadversarial proceeding cannot be binding in any way upon the Commission or UTA, particularly since UTA was not a party to the
Social Security proceedings.
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And apart

from these concerns, the judge's ruling is

simply not persuasive.

Judge Henrie did not give any explana-

tion or analysis to support his assessment of the applicant's
condition.

Also, it is doubtful that Judge Henrie had access

to all of the relevant medical records, for if he had, he would
have certainly noticed that the applicant had reported to his
treating physician a complete resolution of symptoms in his
right arm, and only minimal symptoms in his left.

R. 342/313.

In fact, he probably would have noticed that the applicant's
complaints in the consultative examinations directly conflicted
with the reports he was giving his own treating physician at
the

same time.

Finally, even

if the applicant

did

have

"severe" epicondylitis in 1993, that would not mean that he was
still suffering from that condition in 1996.
b.

Substantial
evidence
supports
the
Commission's finding that the applicant is
not suffering any disability due to
industrially caused depression.

Substantial evidence also supports Judge Elicerio's finding that the applicant's inability to work did not result from
depression associated with the 1989 industrial accident.

In

order to be entitled to permanent total disability benefits for
depression, the applicant would have to prove (1) there is a
causal connection between his 1989 injuries and his present
depression, and (2) there is a causal connection between his
present depression and his claimed permanent total disability.
He has failed to prove either step.
21

The administrative law judge specifically found that the
applicant had suffered from severe depression long before the
1989 injury.

She noted that the medical records revealed that

the applicant had been treated for depression since the 1970's,
and that he had attempted suicide several times.

R. 145. The

applicant

and

had

been

through

family-of-origin problems."

"extremely
Id.

tragic

violent

He reported that his father

was violent and abusive, and that his father had even been
imprisoned for murdering the applicant's brother.

R. 343/015.

The record also revealed numerous nonindustrial causes for
depression in the past few years.

The applicant has a host of

physical problems, including chronic back pain, esophagitis,
asthma, migraine headaches, and hand tremors. R. 343/021. And
in late 1990, when the applicant began seeing Katrina Miller,
his mother had recently died, and his daughter was suffering
from leukemia.
sessions

with

R. 147.
Ms.

And the notes from the applicant's

Miller

reveal

that

the

applicant

was

undergoing a great deal of problems with his wife, including
problems with communication, marital relations, control of
finances, etc.

R. 224-228.

When the applicant saw Dr. Heinbecker in 1993, he went
into great detail explaining the psychological problems he was
facing.

R. 343/016.

But nowhere did he attribute his depres-

sion or other problems to either his arm injury or his relationship with UTA.

Id.

The applicant did state that he was

suffering cluster headaches, chronic back pain, and chronic
22

pain in his arms, but as shown by the records of his treating
physician, his arm pain had cleared up by then, so any pain the
applicant was feeling must have come from his back pain and
headaches.
Indeed, Dr. Heinbecker reported at that time that the
applicant's

depression

was

in

partial

remission,

and

he

concluded that the applicant's inability to work at that point
was due to chronic pain, and not to depression.
The applicant's depression
interact

socially,

persistence.

but

R. 343/017.

interfered with his ability to

not

to

sustain

concentration

Id.

or
I

Once again, the evidence the applicant presents in his
brief

does

not compel

judge's findings.

reversal

of the administrative

law

As discussed earlier, the Social Security

ruling is of limited significance.

However, even the Social

Security ruling does not mention any connection between the
applicant's arm injury and his depression. Also, after finding
that the applicant

suffered

from depression,

Judge Henrie

assessed the functional limitations imposed by that condition.5
5

Under the Social Security regulations, if a claimant has
a physical impairment that meets or equals a listed impairment,
disability is presumed.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d) (1997).
However, if a claimant is seeking a disability award for a
mental
impairment, the hearing officer or administrative law
judge is required to consider any functional
limitations
imposed by that impairment, looking at four key areas of
functioning: activities of daily living; social functioning;
concentration, persistence, or pace; and deterioration or
decompensation in work or a work-like setting. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520a (1997).
In order to meet the listing for an
"affective disorder," a claimant must demonstrate functional
limitations in at least two of the four categories. 20 C.F.R.
23

Judge Henrie found that the applicant did not have any functional limitations significant enough to meet the requirements
for a listed impairment.
And

Judge

Elicerio

R. 343/037.
was

certainly

acting

within

her

discretion to refuse to be persuaded by the letter written by
Katrina Miller in 1995.

R. 159.

simply not compelling evidence.

Once again, this letter is
First, Ms. Miller does not

appear to have been in a good position to give a reliable
assessment of the applicant's condition or its causes. She had
only seen the applicant four times, over a period of only two
months, and the letter was written a full four years after the
last time she had seen the applicant.

Id.

In addition, it

does not appear that Ms. Miller had sufficient information
regarding the applicant's own history. For example, Ms. Miller
stated that while the applicant had had his share of "stress"
in the past, he had been able to employ coping strategies to
effectively

mitigate

that

stress.

She

stated

that

the

applicant "was able to look at his problems as challenges, and
felt he had a reasonable amount of control in his life."

Id.

She was apparently unaware that the applicant had in fact been
depressed for most of his life, and that he had made a number
of suicide attempts.
In addition, Ms. Miller's assessment is based upon the
information that the applicant gave her, but Judge Elicerio
specifically found that the applicant has had a history of
Part 404, Appendix 1 to Subpart P (1997); R. 343/037.
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giving unreliable

information to his physicians.

R. 151.

Finally, Ms. Miller's letter refers to "the fact that [the
applicant] has not recovered from his depression."

R. 159.

But Ms. Miller acknowledged that she had not seen the applicant
in over four years, so it would be impossible for her to make
this assessment.

And Ms. Miller's 1995 letter appears to be

inconsistent with her own treatment notes; the notes from her
sessions with the applicant reveal only a brief mention of
"fighting" with UTA; instead, the overwhelming majority of the
time was spent discussing the problems the applicant was having
with

his

wife,

relations, etc.
c.

including

communication

problems,

marital

R. 224-28.
The Commission specifically found that the
applicant was not credible.

It is highly significant that Judge Elicerio specifically
found that the applicant was not a credible witness, and that
the statements he made to his evaluating physicians were not
reliable.

Judge Elicerio noted that the applicant reported

symptoms to his evaluating physicians that directly contradicted the reports he was giving his own treating physicians at
the

same time.

R.

151.

The

judge also found that the

applicant was exaggerating the importance of his industrial
injury while downplaying his nonindustrial problems, while
during the social security proceedings he did the opposite.
Id.

Finally, Judge Elicerio found it inconsistent that the

applicant could claim that his arm pain and depression were his
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most significant problems, when he had not sought any treatment
for those problems for years.
Judge

Elicerio's

R. 150-51.

finding

regarding

the

credibility is entitled to great deference.
specifically

noted

that

"the

fact

finder

applicant's

This court has
is

in

position to judge the credibility of a witness."

the best

Featherstone

v. Indus. Comm'n, 877 P.2d 1251, 1254 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Indeed,

the

trier

of

fact may

uncontroverted testimony.

even

choose

to

disbelieve

Id. An appellate court will rarely

if ever overturn a factual determination that a witness is not
credible, particularly where that finding is as well-supported
as the one in this case.
d.

The Commission's findings are entitled to
deference.

This court has explained that "'it is not our prerogative
on review to reweigh the evidence.
Commission's

Instead, we defer to the

findings because, when

reasonably

conflicting

views arise, it is the Commission's province to draw inferences
and resolve those conflicts.'"

VanLeeuwen v. Indus. Comm'n,

901 P.2d 281, 284 (quotation omitted).

The appellate court

will not substitute its judgment for the Industrial Commission
"even though we may have come to a different conclusion had the
case come before us for de novo review."

Grace Drilling Co. v.

Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
the applicant's

It is

burden to present enough evidence to prove his

case, and the Commission,

after carefully

considering

evidence, found that he simply had not met his burden.
26

the
The

applicant failed to marshal the evidence supporting the Commission's factual findings, and the evidence that the applicant
did choose to discuss does not weaken the validity of those
findings.

The

Commissions''

findings

must

therefore

be

affirmed.
C.

Utah case law supports the Commission's decision.

This court has previously upheld denials of permanent
total disability benefits when an employee's disability was
caused by conditions other than a work-related injury.

For

example, in Large v. Industrial Commission, 758 P.2d 954 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988), this court affirmed the Commission's denial of
permanent total disability benefits for an employee who had
sustained a ten percent impairment from an industrial accident.
Medical examinations revealed that the applicant was suffering
from preexisting arthritis, fibrositis, and other problems, and
the Commission found that the employee's age, obesity, lack of
transferable skills and preexisting back condition caused his
disability.

Id. at 955. The court found that this finding was

supported by substantial evidence.

Id. at 957.

Similarly, in Ortiz v. Industrial Commission, 766 P.2d
1092 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), the employee sustained an industrial
back injury and then was involved in two automobile accidents.
In support of his claim for permanent total disability benefits, he testified that, even before the automobile accidents,
he had been suffering from increasing back pain.

In addition,

he introduced medical evidence that his back was gradually
27

degenerating and that he would have been forced to retire early
even without the auto accidents.

The medical panel, however,

disagreed, finding no evidence of degeneration. The Commission
chose to believe the medical panel report and to disbelieve the
employee's evidence.

Once again, this court affirmed.

Id. at

1095.
Finally, in Zupon v. Industrial Commission, 860 P.2d 960
(Utah Ct. App. 1993), this court upheld a denial of permanent
total

disability

benefits,

even

though

the

employee

had

suffered a ten percent permanent partial impairment from an
industrial back injury.

The employee had received a Social

Security Disability award, but the basis of this award was
arthritis in his hands. The Commission held that the employee
had failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
his industrial accident was a medical cause of his claimed
permanent total disability, and this court affirmed, finding
that the Commission's ruling was based on substantial ervidence.
Our case is analogous to Large, Ortiz, and Zupon. Just as
in those cases, the applicant

is claiming permanent

total

disability for an industrial injury, but the evidence shows
that, if the applicant is permanently totally disabled, it is
not because of the industrial accident.

The applicant has a

host of other physical and emotional problems unrelated to the
accident,

as

detailed

by

Judge

Elicerio,

and

while

the

applicant does suffer from depression, the judge found that
this depression was not related to the industrial accident.
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The

judge also found that the applicant

limitations due to arm pain.

is not suffering

The applicant has received a six

percent impairment rating for his arm, but his rating was less
than the ten percent rating given the employee in Zupon.
P.2d at 963.

860

Just as in those cases, the Commission's ruling

is supported by substantial evidence, and this court should
affirm.

II.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION APPLIED THE CORRECT
LEGAL STANDARD

There is nothing to support the applicant's contention
that the Commission applied an improper standard.
Elicerio

expressed

some uncertainty

regarding

While Judge
the

precise

boundaries of the test for medical causation, a reading of her
opinion demonstrates that the test she actually applied was
correct.

Additionally,

a

reading

of

the ALJ's

and

the

Commission's orders shows that the Commission's finding that
the

applicant

had

failed

to

prove medical

causation

was

supported by substantial evidence, regardless of the precise
test used, because the applicant
suffered

any

limitations

related

accident.
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failed to prove that he
to

his

1989

industrial

A.

The Commission did not require the applicant to
prove a
"substantial connection" between his
industrial accident and his claimed disability.

In her order dismissing the applicant's claim, Judge
Elicerio reasoned as follows:
The ALJ knows that the appellate courts have been
scornful of reading any requirement of "substantially "-caused-by into the law. However,
taken
to

its illogical
extreme, if one uses the
opposite
standard,
namely
any-causal-contribution-issufficient,
then
any
applicant
with
some
industrially
caused permanent impairment can argue
that their
eventual discontinuance
of work was
caused by the industrial
accident,
no matter how
small it is, because that impairment contributed
to
their

overall

disability.

. • . Because the ALJ is

disinclined to read the law to require all
applicants with permanent impairment to be entitled
to permanent total disability benefits when they
discontinue working, the ALJ will not apply the anycausal-contribution-is-sufficient standard in this
case.
R. 152 (italics and bold print added) (Addendum Exhibit 1 ) .
As the court can see, there is nothing wrong with the
analytical process used by the administrative law judge.

In

her analysis, she specifically acknowledged that the case law
does not

require that a disability be "substantially" caused by

an industrial injury to be compensable. In the passages emphasized above, Judge Elicerio simply noted that she would not
require an employer to pay permanent total disability compensation on the mere showing that an employee had an industrial
impairment; instead, she was going to require some level of
actual causal connection between the industrial accident and
the claimed disability.
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And Judge Elicerio's reasoning in this regard was completely correct:

it has never been held that the mere fact

that an employee has some industrially caused impairment entitles that person to permanent total disability compensation.
"Impairment" and "disability" are distinct concepts, and the
fact that the applicant has an impairment does not mean that he
has any disability whatsoever.

See, e.g., Smith v. Mity Lite,

939 P.2d 684, 687-88 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
P. 2d

960

(claim

for

permanent

total

See also Zupon, 860
disability

properly

rejected even though the employee had a 10% permanent partial
impairment resulting from an industrial accident); Large, 758
P.2d 954 (benefits denied even though the applicant had a 5%
impairment attributable to his industrial accident).

See also

Hodges v. Western Piling & Sheeting Co., 717 P.2d 718 (Utah
1986) (permanent total disability claim properly denied even
though the employee had a thirty-five

percent

impairment from

his industrial accident).
A

look

at

the

reasoning

actually

employed

Elicerio shows that she used the proper test.
she found that the applicant
suffering from any
injuries.

by

Judge

In her order,

failed to prove that he was

disability as a result of the 1989 arm

She found that his arm problems themselves had been

resolved for years, and that he had failed to prove that he was
presently

suffering

from

depression

related

to

the

arm

problems.

She also found that the applicant was not credible.

Based on these findings, which were not properly challenged on
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appeal, her finding that the applicant failed to prove medical
causation is perfectly in accord with the test used in the
governing authority, including Large, Ortiz, and Zupon.
We

also

administrative

note

that

the

Commission,

law judge, is the ultimate

and

not

the

finder of fact,

Commercial Carriers v. Indus. Comm'n, 888 P.2d 707, 710 (Utah
Ct. App. 1994), and there is nothing in the Commission's order
denying the applicant's motion for review to suggest that the
Commission

required a "substantial connection" between the

applicant's work injury and his claimed disability.
B.

The Commission's findings are entitled to be upheld
because they are supported by substantial evidence,
regardless
of whether the Commission
clearly
articulated the precise standard.

The Court of Appeals will uphold Industrial Commission
findings where they are supported by substantial evidence, even
if the Commission does not clearly or precisely articulate the
standard it is following, and even if the Commission applies an
incorrect standard.

For example, in Intermountain Health Care

v. Board of Review, 839 P.23 841 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), the
administrative law judge had asked the medical panel whether
there was a "medically demonstrable causal connection" between
the applicant's

industrial

accident

suffered after a subsequent event.

and back problems

she

Id. at 843. The Commission

awarded benefits and the employer appealed, arguing that the
ALJ had used an improper standard.

The court noted that the

standard as phrased in the request to the medical panel was
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incorrect,

but

it

explained

that

"despite

the

imprecise

phrasing of the causation question submitted to the medical
panel, the ALJ, after examining the panel's report, applied the
correct legal standard in determining causation."
And
decision

in

Large,

even

when

incorrect standard.

this
the

court

affirmed

Commission

758 P.2d at 957.

the

actually

Id. at 846.
Commission's

did

apply

an

As discussed earlier,

the issue in Large was whether the employee's permanent total
disability was medically caused by his industrial accident. In
rejecting the employee's claim, the Commission
"proximate cause" analysis.

had used a

This court held that a proximate

cause analysis is not proper in workers' compensation matters,
but it upheld the decision anyway, concluding that the findings
were

supported

by

substantial

evidence.

The court

held,

"Although the Industrial Commission erroneously applied the
proximate cause test rather than the causation test articulated
in Allen and Hodges, we find substantial evidence to support a
finding that the 1985 injury was not the medical cause of
Large's permanent total disability status . . . ." Id. at 957.
In our case, it is clear from the record that neither the
administrative law judge nor the Industrial Commission applied
an incorrect

standard.

The law requires the applicant to

prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, a "causal connection," and the Commission
failed to meet this burden.

simply

found that the applicant

Just as in Intermountain Health

Care and Large, the fact that the administrative law judge's
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language may have been a little imprecise does not compel
reversal of the findings, especially where those findings are
clearly supported by substantial evidence in the record.
C.

Under the governing statute, an employee must prove
more than a mere "causal connection" to be entitled
to permanent total disability compensation.

Finally, something more than a mere "causal connection" is
required to justify awarding permanent total disability benefits under the statute governing permanent total disability
claims.

Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67(1)

(1988).

The

cases

applying the mere "causal connection" standard to permanent
total disability claims, such as Large, adopted this standard
directly from Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah
1986).

But Allen did not deal with the permanent

disability statute.

total

Instead, Allen interpreted and applied

section 35-1-45, which required that, for an accident to be
compensable at

all,

it need only "aris[e] out of and in the

course of" the employment.

Allen, 729 P.2d at 18, 24.

Permanent total disability claims, however, are governed
by a different statute, section 35-1-67.

And up until 1995,

that statute expressly provided that permanent total disability
benefits were to be awarded only "[i]n case of permanent total
disability caused

by an industrial accident."

§ 35-1-67(1) (1988).6

Utah Code Ann.

This standard is significantly stricter

6

In 1995 this statute was amended.
The language in the
opening sentence was changed to "permanent total disability
resulting
from an industrial accident," but elsewhere the statute
was amended to clarify that permanent total disability benefits are
to be awarded only where an employee suffers a "significant"
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than the one set forth in section 35-1-45•

As this court has

recently noted,
"'Arising out of, /H however, does not mean that the
accident must be "'caused by /n the employment;
rather, the employment "is thought of more as a
condition
out of which the event arises than as the
force producing the event in affirmative fashion.'"
Buczvnski v. Indus. Comm'n, 934 P.2d 1169, 1172 (Utah Ct. App.
1997) (emphasis in original) (quoting Commercial Carriers, 888
P.2d at 712).
Thus,

as

the

reasoning

from

Buczynski,

Commercial

Carriers, and several other cases demonstrates, a requirement
that disability be

"caused by" an accident necessitates a

stronger causal connection than a requirement that an injury
merely "arise out of" the employment.

And while section 35-1-

45 does not require that a disability be
employment, section 35-1-67 does
The

statutory

requirement

"caused by" the

by its own terms.
of a stricter

standard

for

permanent total disability claims makes perfect sense. For the
"arising

out

of" statute,

section

35-1-45, is simply

the

"gateway" statute; any employee must meet that standard, even
if he or she is simply asking the employer to pay for something
like x-rays.

In addition, compensation for temporary total,

temporary partial, or permanent partial is limited under the
statute, both because compensation is awarded only while the

impairment, and if that impairment is a "direct" cause of the
permanent total disability. See Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67(1)(b)
(1995 Supp.).
35

employee still needs it and because the statute provides a
maximum level of benefits.
Permanent total disability benefits, however, are of a
completely different nature. Most significantly, they provide
a lifetime

entitlement.7

And, as the statute read at the time

of the applicant's injury, there was no provision for future
reexamination of a worker's need for permanent total disability
compensation, nor was there a provision for a setoff should the
employee find gainful employment. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 351-67 (1988) with Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(7) , (11) (1997).
Thus, while temporary total disability ceases when the employee
is no longer disabled, permanent

total disability does not. It

is entirely logical that the legislature would require a higher
level of causation before awarding a person lifetime benefits.

III. THE COMMISSION'S ORDER SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.

This case presents a classic example of why appellate
courts grant deference to an agency's factual findings.

The

evidence before the Commission included over 500 pages of
medical records alone, plus the applicant's live testimony.
Judge Elicerio personally

saw and heard the applicant and

7

While the employer is directly liable for the first 312
weeks of compensation under the 1988 version of the statute,
lifetime benefits would still have to be paid by the Employers'
Reinsurance Fund, which is financed by a tax on workers'
compensation insurers. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67(4) (1988),
Utah Code Ann. § 59-9-101(2) (1996).
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sifted through the evidence, and she is by far in the best
position to make a ruling as to whether the applicant's claimed
disability

resulted

from his industrial accidents.

Judge

Elicerio's thorough order shows that the judge considered the
evidence carefully

and that she used a logical and sound

reasoning process in reaching her decision*

Her decision is

certainly supported by the evidence, even if she did express
uncertainty regarding the precise boundaries of the standard
she

was

applying.

The

Commission

then

reviewed

the

administrative law judge's ruling and came to the same finding.
The petitioner has not demonstrated any error, and as such the
Commission's order should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
Respondent Utah Transit Authority therefore respectfully
requests that this court affirm the Industrial Commission's
order

denying

the

applicant's

claim

for

permanent

disability compensation.
DATED this 19th day of November, 1997.

HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE

TH^EODORE E. KANELL
STEPHEN P. HORVAT
Attorneys for Respondent
Utah Transit Authority
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 94842

GEORGE FARNWORTH,
Applicant,
VS.

UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY
(Self-Insured),

*
*
*
*
*
^
*
*

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

•k

Defendant.

*
4.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah,
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on
February 9, 1995 at 8:30 o'clock a.m. Said hearing
was pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The applicant was present and was represented by
David K. Smith, Attorney.
The defendant was represented by Theodore Kanell,
Attorney.

This case involves a claim for permanent tot^l disability
claim related to a May 2, 1989 right elbow injury.
The selfinsured employer initially accepted liability on the elbow injury
and paid temporary total compensation (TTC) from May 2, 1989
through May 31, 1990, at the rate of $300.00/week, for a total of
$14,143.00. The employer also paid for a 10% upper extremity (6%
whole person) permanent impairment rating for the right elbow/arm
(21.8 weeks of benefits at the rate of $229.00/week for a total of
$4992.20).
After the applicant returned to work at UTA, he
developed left elbow/arm problems and additional right elbow/arm
problems. A dispute arore regarding the employer's liability for
additional treatment and time off work. This dispute was resolved
pursuant to Industrial Commission litigation, culminating in
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order issued by this ALJ
on October 7, 1992. Pursuant to that order, the applicant was
awarded additional TTC for the period of January 7, 1991 through
January 28, 1991, for time off work related to a second right elbow
surgery, and was awarded additional future TTC for time off work
related to a left elbow surgery, yet to occur at the time of the
issuance of the order. The extent of benefits paid related to the
left elbow surgery (accomplished in November 1992) is unclear.
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The current claim for permanent total disability benefits
related to the May 2, 1989 industrial accident was filed on
September 26, 1994. A cover letter signed by the applicant's
attorney, filed with the application for hearing, indicates that
the applicant's claim for permanent total disability benefits was
related to injury to the applicant's arms that "triggered the onset
of a deep depression from which he was unable to recover." At
hearing, the applicant clarified the basis of the claim to be
chronic bilateral arm pain, with aggravation to the applicant's
pre-existing depression related to that pain. The defendant denied
liability for the permanent total disability claim, because the
medical records reflect that the applicant had a successful
recovery from the elbow/arm surgeries, with minimal residual
impairment. At the time of the hearing, the defendant pointed out
that the applicant was offered a light duty release after his final
elbow/arm surgery and was engaged in a vocational rehabilitation
program during 1990-91, through the Division of Rehabilitation
Services. The defendant maintains that the applicant's December
1993 Social Security Disability award is based on several
conditions that are completely unrelated to his May 1989 industrial
accident, including problems that both pre-existed the industrial
accident and that developed after that accident.
As such, the
defendant maintains that the Social Security Disability award is
not supportive of the applicant's claim that he is permanently
totally disabled due to the May 1989 right elbow injury.
At the time of the hearing, the ALJ inquired regarding
psychiatric treatment records for the depression, as none were
contained in the medical record exhibit submitted at hearing. The
applicant identified several medical care providers at that time
and the ALJ agreed to allow additional time post-hearing for
submission of a joint addendum medical record exhibit.
That
exhibit never was filed, and as a result, the ALJ presumed that the
applicant had decided not to pursue the claim any longer and she
dismissed the case, explaining why, in an Order of Dismissal dated
June 20, 1996. On June 25, 1996, the ALJ received a letter from
counsel for the applicant, indicating that he objected to dismissal
of the case, as he had presumed that the defendant was going to
submit the addendum exhibit.
With the letter, the applicant's
attorney submitted a letter of K. Miller, LMFT, dated October 25,
1995, along with several pages of handwritten office notes, as
medical evidence of the applicant's treatment for depression.
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On July 18, 1996, the ALJ wrote counsel for the applicant
and indicated that she was considering his June 25, 1996 letter to
be a Motion to Set Aside the Order of Dismissal. The ALJ gave the
defendant 15 days in which to respond to that Motion. The ALJ also
commented in her responsive letter to the applicant's attorney that
the addtional records submitted might be insufficient to support a
claim for permanent total disability based on depression. On July
23, 1996 the ALJ received the defendant's response to the
applicant's Motion to Set Aside the Order of Dismissal. On August
8, 1996, the ALJ wrote the parties and indicated that she was
considering the matter ready for an order on the Motion as of
August 8, 1996. The ALJ indicated that she felt the primary issue
that needed resolution was whether or not the applicant had
submitted sufficient supportive medical evidence in order to
establish that the May 2, 1989 industrial accident was the cause of
his permanent total disability. The ALJ indicated that she planned
to review all the evidence presented, including some piecemeal
loose medical records that the applicant had submitted posthearing, the official joint medical record exhibit (Exhibit D-l)
and the applicant's hearing testimony.
EVIDENCE PRESENTED:
The
ALJ
will
attempt
to
summarize
the
evidence
chronologically, but this case presents some difficulty in this
regard, as the applicant developed many of his conditions
simultaneously, and got treatment for his different non-industrial
medical problems on-and-off, before, during and after his treatment
for his industrially related arm problems. Chronologically, the
first medical records are from the 1970's and early 1980's,
consisting primarily of emergency room admissions for overdoses of
drugs and alcohol and suicide/homicide threats or attempts. Based
on
the
very
brief
ER
summaries,
the
applicant's
emotional/psychiatric problems, at that time, were due to extremely
tragic and violent family-of-origin problems.
The last ER
admission for this is dated 1984, with most of the admissions
occurring in 1978.
The applicant had gastro-intestinal problems, prompting
physician review, beginning in 1986 and 1987. These problems were
eventually diagnosed as including a hiatal hernia, reflux
esophagitis, and duodenal ulcers.
The next intensive medical
review/treatment that the applicant had was related to his elbows
(lateral epicondylitis) in 1989 and early 1990. A detailed history

/

ORDER
RE: GEORGE FARNWORTH
PAGE 4

of the applicant's right elbow treatment following the May 2, 1989
industrial accident is found in the ALJ's earlier order dated
October 7, 1992. In summary, the applicant had a release surgery
on the right arm in July 1989 and was released to return to work in
October 1989. The applicant worked about 3 weeks and then was off
work again, pursuing treatment/analysis of symptoms in both elbows.
The applicant returned to work again in November 1989 and worked
very sporadically thereafter until April or May 1990, getting
conservative care for his elbows during that time. Then, in April
or May of 1990, the applicant had back surgery. The ALJ mentions
this in her previous order, but she has never received any medical
records relating to this. The surgery apparently helped somewhat,
but the applicant was to have chronic back pain develop in the
future. In June 1990, the applicant's treating physician for the
right elbow, Dr. D. Sellers, rated the applicant's right elbow (10%
upper extremity/6% whole person) and the applicant was paid for the
impairment.
While attending school during the Summer and Fall of 1990,
the applicant continued with some conservative care for both of his
elbows from both Dr. D. Sellers and Dr. J. Adams.
Additional
surgery for one or both elbows was recommended, but was postponed
to allow the applicant to continue his schooling. He apparently
was involved in electronics training initially.
The applicant
stated at hearing that he had problems with pain (unspecified) and
concentration in school and ended up missing quite a t(it of school.
Per his testimony, DRS then recommended he switch to schooling at
Salt Lake Community College, but the applicant stated he was unable
to attend even one hour of classes (unclear why). The applicant
had a Nissen fundoplication surgery, in September 1990, to deal
with his gastro-intestinal problems. A physician who reviewed the
applicant's medical conditions in relation to his application for
Social Security benefits, specified, in 1993, that the applicant
felt that that surgery was not effective.
Although there are numerous prior indications in the records
that the applicant had chronic bronchitis/asthma due to a long
history of smoking cigarettes, the first indication that the ALJ
can find, indicating prescription of an inhaler, is in December
1990.
The applicant continued with breathing/coughing problems
thereafter, prompting physician review and treatment, primarily at
Granger Medical Clinic, through at least 1994. There continued to
be a dispute between the applicant and UTA regarding management of
his elbow treatment and in December 1990, the applicant began to
see a counselor for psychological therapy for his depression. This
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counselor was Katrina Miller, LMFT. Her letter to the applicant's
attorney dated October 25, 1995 states that "feelings evoked from
the skirmish with UTA was listed as Mr. Farnworth's chief
complaint," However, it is also noted in the medical records that
the applicant's mother died in November 1990 and the applicant's
daughter was diagnosed as having leukemia in 1989-90, causing him
some psychological distress. Miller saw the applicant 4 times
between December 12, 1990 and February 12, 1991, and did not see
him thereafter.
The applicant had a second right elbow surgery done by Dr.
J. Adams in January 1991. Dr. Sellers continued to follow up on
the left elbow problems. In March 1991, the applicant had an ER
visit for chest pain, apparently finally assessed to be related to
his gastro-intestinal problems and not due to myocardial
infarction. In April 1991, the appliant began to see Dr. P. Savia
for chronic back pain. Dr. Savia recommended physical therapy and
followed up with the applicant, on and off all through the
remainder of 1991. In June 1991, Dr. Adams indicated that the
applicant had a good result from the second right arm/elbow surgery
and could return to work, without repetitive use of the right arm.
In July 1991, Dr. Sellers noted that the applicant was back to
normal with respect to the right arm/elbow and was pain free. When
the applicant was seen in September 1991 by employer-chosen
physician Dr. G. Moress, Dr. Moress noted that the applicant felt
his right arm/elbow was great.
After following the applicant's chronic back pain during the
last 8 months of 1991, Dr. Savia noted a new problem in January
1992, i.e. chronic headaches. After January 1992, the applicant
got follow-up of his back pain and his bronchitis/asthma through
Granger Medical Clinic. In October 1992, the applicant began to
get treatment for sleep apnea and related breathing problems. Dr.
Dupont reviewed his symptoms in relating to a home oximeter study
that he conducted.
Dr. Dupont
listed
the
applicant's
problems/symptoms as follows:
depression, snoring, reports of breathing cessation
while
asleep,
personality
changes,
being
overweight, loss of libido, non-refreshing sleep,
difficulty concentrating, trouble at work because
of sleepiness, often falling asleep during the day
while trying to stay awake, unable to move while
waking or falling asleep, chronic cough, morning
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hoarseness, waking up coughing or wheezing,
frequent sore throats, muscle tension in legs,
restless legs, waking with sore muscles, abnormal
sleep/wake schedule, and shortness of breath
frequently smokes cigarettes . . . . frequently drinks
caffeinated beverages in the evening . . . . history
of unspecified nose surgery . . . . hiatal hernia and
gastric reflux • . . . 40 lb. weight gain over past
two years . . . . on medications that include Xanax,
Feldene, Aspirin, Bronchial Dilator and Max Air
Inhalar
In December 1992, the applicant had nasal septal surgery
chronic sinusitis and sleep apnea.

for

In August of 1992, the applicant apparently made his first
application for Social Security Disability benefits.
This was
denied initially in October 1992.
In November of 1992, the
applicant had his left arm surgery. In April 1993, his treating
surgeon, Dr. D. Sellers, indicates in his office note that the
applicant's left arm had only "an occasional bit of discomfort
after using it extensively" and "on the right side, this has
completely resolved."
Although there is an indication that a
rating was to be performed, the ALJ has been unable to find any
indication of a permanent impairment rating assessed in association
with the left arm.
The applicant requested reconsideration of his initial
denial of Social Security Disability benefits, and in connection
with this, in March and April 1993, he was seen by two physicians
connected with Social Security, Dr. P. Heinbecker, apparently a
psychiatrist, and Dr. G. McFadden, possibly an internist.
Dr.
Heinbecker noted depression, arm and back problems, hiatal hernia
and hand tremors. He noted that the applicant had been depressed
most of his life.
Although the applicant admitted to Dr.
Heinbecker that his left arm surgery had been successful, he stated
that his right arm surgery and his hiatal hernia surgery were
unsuccessful. Dr. Heinbecker noted severe back pain with exertion
and a history of asthma for 6-7 years.
He noted that the
applicant's daughter had been diagnosed with leukemia in 1989 and
that the family was financially strapped as a result.
Per Dr.
Heinbecker, the applicant stated that the reason he could not work
was because of constant pain, unspecified as to location. Dr.
Heinbecker noted the sources of pain to be his back, his headaches
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and his arms. He diagnosed the applicant as having a personality
disorder and major depression in remission. Dr. McFadden noted
poorly
controlled
asthma, depression, migraine headaches,
esophagitis (possibly aggravated by back pain medication),
epicondylitis (with minimal restrictions resulting), back pain,
sleep apnea, benign familial tremor and sinusitis.
In May 1993, the applicant's request for reconsideration of
his Social Security denial was denied and the original
determination affirmed. The letter explaining the decision states:
"Although your condition may prevent you from performing your past
work as a bus driver, it would permit you to do other lighter
work."
After this denial, the applicant again appealed and
requested a hearing. The November 1993 hearing resulted in the
applicant being granted benefits, with disability beginning in May
1989, despite the fact that the applicant did perform some work
after that date (apparently earning an insufficient amount to be
considered gainful).
By the appendix citing in the hearing
decision, there is a suggestion that the award may be primarily
based on the applicant's depression.
However, there are some
handwritten transmittal forms that have been submitted that suggest
that the applicant's epicondylitis is the primary diagnosis,
despite Dr. McFadden's indication that this presented minimal
restrictions. It is unclear if these handwritten forms are the
actual final official forms designating the reason for the award.
The ALJ would have to say that the reason for the reversal of the
earlier denials is simply unclear from the records presented.
At hearing, despite the indications in the medical records
of good results from the arm surgeries, the applicant stated that
his arm pain, bilaterally, was improved only somewhat by the
surgeries (from a pain level of 10 out of 10 down to a 5 or 6) . In
addition, the applicant stated that the pain level gradually
increased after his surgeries, so that his arm pain in both arms is
now at a 7 or 8 out of 10. With respect to his depression, the
applicant stated merely that he has had bouts of depression in the
past, but now feels that he cannot play with his kids, cannot leave
the house and cannot work. He stated that he gets panicky in rush
hour traffic. When asked about his sleep apnea, the applicant
stated that this was caused by weight gain (a gain of 100 pounds
per his testimony) after the May 2, 1989 accident. He stated he
gained this weight because he could not do anything after the
accident.
With respect to his gastro-intestinal problems, he
stated that he had had no problems since the surgery (apparently
the fundoplication surgery in 1990 which he told Dr. Heinbecker was
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unsuccessful) .
With respect to the hand tremor that he has
bilaterally, he states that this was worsened since the surgery
(unclear which surgery). Prioritizing his problems, he stated that
this arm pain and depression is his worst problem, with his back
pain and sleep apnea being the second and third worst problems.
The applicant stated that he has gotten no further review
of his arm/elbow pain, since stabilizing from the surgeries in 1991
and 1992, because there is no further treatment available.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
In the end result, the ALJ finds that the preponderance of
the evidence indicates that the applicant's permanent total
disability was not caused by the May 2, 1989 elbow injury or
injuries. There is a long list of medical problems that have been
significant problems for the applicant since the 1989 injury, all
of which are documented clearly in the medical records. On the
other hand, the records show only a good surgical result from the
arm surgeries, with little or no pain or restriction in the arms by
April 1993. The only evidentiary support for the arm symptoms
continuing to be a problem, after that date, is the applicant's
testimony that the pain got worse after that time. There are a
number of reasons why the ALJ feels it inappropriate to rely solely
on the applicant's testimony in this regard (to be explained
below) .
A similar analysis can be made with respect to the
applicant's claim of depression related to the industrial accident.
The applicant himself admits that he had pre-existing depression
and alleges only that the arm pain, and possibly the dispute with
UTA regarding a course of treatment for the arms, aggravated the
depression. However, even if one agrees that some aggravation may
have occurred, there is no evidence of any permanent aggravation
and little objective evidence that there is any residual pain to
act as a source for the aggravation.
The ALJ finds it difficult to understand how the arm pain
and depression can be the most significant problems that the
applicant has (per his testimony) and result in no treatment or
analysis. The applicant has been seen within the past few years by
physicians for a number of other problems, including his sleep
apnea and back pain, which the applicant lists as lesser problems.
It does not make sense to the ALJ that the applicant would refrain
from physician review of his worst problems and seek out review for

/sb
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problems of lesser significance to him. He has had no review or
treatment for his arms since he was released to return to work
after the arm surgeries and he has had no treatment for depression
since 1991.
The more logical interpretation of his lack of
treatment for arm pain and depression is that these are not
significantly effecting him.
The ALJ notes that one has to be concerned regarding the
reliability
of the applicant's testimony when he offers
contradictory information to his physicians.
In mid-1991, the
right arm was assessed to be normal and pain free by Dr. Sellers,
and in 1993, at the time he was being assessed by the Social
Security doctors, Dr. Sellers consistently found that the right arm
symptoms had completely resolved. Despite this, at the same time
as Dr. Sellers found the right arm symptoms resolved, the applicant
told Dr. Heinbecker with Social Security that the right arm surgery
was not successful.
Another reason that the ALJ finds the applicant's testimony,
to be unpersuasive, is that it appears that he is exaggerating the
import of the industrial accident currently, while it was not
emphasized as a concern when he was applying for Social Security
Disability. He told Dr. Heinbecker in 1993 that at least the left
arm surgery was successful, but he indicated at hearing that it was
not, and that the surgery caused only a temporary minimal relief in
his pain level. Although mentioned as one source of chronic pain
to the Social Security doctors, the applicant did not relate the
arm pain as the most bothersome problem or as a source of
disability. Dr. McFadden found it to cause minimal restrictions.
Similarly, Dr. Heinbecker noted that the applicant's depression was
in remission at the time of his examination in 1993 and he also
noted multiple non-industrial sources for the depression. Also, in
addition to currently emphasizing problems allegedly related to the
industrial accident, the applicant now downplays his other
problems. He noted at hearing that his gastro-intestinal problems
were resolved by his 1990 surgery, but told Dr. Heinbecker in 1993
that that surgery was unsuccessful. Those non-industrial problems
that he admits to, he states were either aggravated by the
industrial accident or caused by it, including his depression, his
hand tremor and even his sleep apnea, which he states was caused by
weight gain caused by inactivity that he ultimately feels was
caused apparently by either his arm pain or depression. There is
no medical evidence to support the applicant's claim that these
problems were caused or even aggravated by the 1989 industrial
right elbow injury.
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The ALJ should note that she is not sure at this time what
the appropriate causal standard is for assessing causation of
permanent total disability. Most permanent total disability cases
involve discontinuance of work due to a number of medical problems,
some industrial and some non-industrial. The ALJ knows that the
appellate courts have been scornful of reading any requirement of
11
substantially"-caused-by into the law.
However, taken to its
illogical extreme, if one uses the opposite standard, namely anycausal-contribution-is-sufficient, then any applicant with some
industrially caused permanent impairment can argue that their
eventual discontinuance of work was caused by the industrial
accident that caused their impairment, no matter how small it is,
because that impairment contributed to their overall disability.
If this is the correct standard, then the result would have to be
that the applicant in this case is entitled to permanent total
disability benefits, because he does have a 10% upper extremity (6%
whole person) impairment related to the 1989 right elbow injury.
Because the ALJ is disinclined to read the law to require all
applicants with permanent impairment to be entitled to permanent
total disability benefits when they discontinue working, the ALJ
will not apply the any-causal-contribution-is-sufficient standard
in this case. However, the case law being somewhat undeveloped at
this time, this may be determined to be incorrect.
Because of the above analysis the ALJ finds that the
applicant's inability to work at this time is not caused by any
permanent aggravation to his pre-existing depression resulting from
arm pain associated with the industrial accident, because there has
been no evidence that any depression that the applicant has is
permanent in nature and because there appear to be muliple possible
non-industrial sources for any depression that he currently has or
has had in the past.
In addition, the ALJ finds that the
applicant's inability to work at this time is not caused by arm
pain or impairment, as the preponderance of the reliable evidence
shows that the applicant had a good recovery from his industrial
arm surgeries, with only minimal residual activity restriction and
possibly discomfort. The only evidence to the contrary is based on
the applicant's testimony alone and the ALJ has previously stated
why she feels this testimony cannot be the sole basis of an award
in this case. The ALJ should note that the applicant cippears to
have had a very unfortunate course of medical and psychiatric
problems over his life time, along with significant problems
occurring with those close to him, so that one can only sympathize
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with the tremendous resulting difficulties that the applicant has
had to face.
However, the ALJ finds that most of these
difficulties are completely unrelated to the applicant's industrial
accident and employment with UTA.

ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant's claim for
permanent total disability benefits is dismissed for lack of a
causal connection between the applicant's total disability and the
May 2, 1989 industrial accident.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the
foregoing shall be received in the offices of the Commission within
thirty (3 0) days of the date hereof, specifying in detail the
particular errors and objections, and, unless received by the
Commission within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, this Order
shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. If a Motion
for Review is received by the Commission within thirty (30) days of
the date hereof, any response of the opposing party shall be filed
within fifteen (15) days of the date of the receipt of the Motion
for Review by the Commission in accordance with U.C.A. Section 6346b-12.

DATED this 15th day of October, 1996.

Barbara Elicerio
Administrative Law Judge
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Theodore Kanell, Esq.
PO Box 2970
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David K. Smith, Esq.
6925 Union Park Center #600
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FUND,
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Case No. 94-0842

George E. Farnworth asks The Industrial Commission of Utah to review the Administrative
Law Judge's denial of his claim for permanent total disability compensation under the Utah
Workers' Compensation Act.
The Industrial Commission of Utah exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-82.53, and Utah Admin. Code
R568-1-4.M.
ISSUE PRESENTED
Are Mr. Farnworth's injuries from his May 2, 1989 work accident the cause of his present
disability?
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Industrial Commission adopts the ALJ's thorough narrative of the facts of this case. In
summary, Mr. Farnworth has a long and extensive history of medical care for a wide variety of
psychological and medical problems. Most of his problems were not related to his work for Utah
Transit Authority. However, he did suffer work-related epicondylitis of his elbows during 1989 and
1990. By 1992, his problems with his elbows were substantially resolved and resulted in only a 6%
whole person impairment, for which he has received permanent partial disability compensation.
Mr. Farnworth continues to suffer from numerous medical problems that are not related to
his work. He also continues to suffer from depression. In 1993, he was granted Social Security
disability compensation.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Under Utah's Workers Compensation Act, Mr. Farnworth is entitled to permanent total
disability compensation only if he proves that his 1989 work injury caused his now-claimed
permanent total disability. See Utah Code Ann.§ 35-1-67(1); also Large v. Industrial Commission.
758 P.2d 954, 956 (Utah App. 1988). Other issues regarding Mr. Famworth's claim are not reached
unless he first satisfies the threshold causation requirement. Zupon v. Industrial Commission. 860
P.2d 960 (Utah App. 1993).
Having reviewed the ALJ's decision in this matter in light of Mr. Famworth's motion for
review and the evidentiary record, the Industrial Commission agrees with and adopts the ALJ's
careful analysis and her conclusion that Mr. Famworth's work injuries are not the medical cause of
his alleged permanent total disability.
ORDER
The Industrial Commission affirms the decision of the ALJ and denies Mr. Famworth's
motion for review.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Industrial Commission to reconsider this order by filing a request for
reconsideration this Order. Any such request for reconsideration must be received by the Industrial
Commission within 20 days of the date of this order. Alternatively, any party may appeal this order
to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for review with that court. Any such petition for
review must be received by the court within 30 days of the date of this Order.
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I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion For Review in the jnatter of
George E. Famworth Case No. 94-0842 was mailed first class postage prepaid this gkjSffilay of
March, 1997, to the following:
GEORGE FARNSWORTH
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KEARNS,UTAH84118
DAVID K. SMITH
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6925 UNION PARK CENTER #600
MIDVALE, UTAH 84047
THEODORE KANELL
ATTORNEY AT LAW
4 TRIAD CENTER #500
P. O BOX 2970
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84110-2970
ERIE BOORMAN
THE EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND
(Interoffice mail)
UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY
3600 SOUTH 700 WEST
PO BOX 30810
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84130

Adell Butler-Mitchell
Support Specialist
Industrial Commission of Utah
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